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Abstract:  20 
Microcredit—joint liability loans to the poorest of the poor—has been touted as a powerful 21 
approach for combatting global poverty. But sustainability varies dramatically across banks. 22 
Efforts to improve the sustainability of microcredit have assumed defaults are caused by free-23 
riding. Here, we point out that the response of other group members to delinquent groupmates 24 
also plays an important role in defaults. Even in the absence of any free-rider problem, some 25 
people will be unable to make their payments due to bad luck. It is other group members’ 26 
unwillingness to pitch in extra – due to, among other things, not wanting to have less than other 27 
group members – that leads to default. To support this argument, we utilize the Ultimatum Game 28 
(UG), a standard paradigm from behavioral economics for measuring one’s aversion to 29 
inequitable outcomes. First, we show that country-level variation in microloan default rates is 30 
strongly correlated (overall r = 0.81) with country-level UG rejection rates, but not free-riding 31 
measures. We then introduce a laboratory model “Microloan Game,” and present evidence that 32 
defaults arise from inequity averse individuals refusing to make up the difference when others 33 
fail to pay their fair share. This perspective suggests a suite of new approaches for combatting 34 
defaults that leverage findings on reducing UG rejections. 35 
  36 
Introduction 37 
 38 
Microcredit, the offering of small uncollateralized loans, has become a popular tool for fighting 39 
poverty in recent years, particularly in the developing world. In recent years, Microfinance 40 
Institutions (MFIs) have loaned over $100 billion annually to low-income households in at least 41 
119 countries (MIX Market 2008). These loans—largely directed at women living on less than 42 
$2 a day—are often offered to solidarity groups (Hermes & Lensink 2007). Solidarity groups are 43 
a form of joint liability, in which a group of borrowers agree to mutually insure each other’s 44 
loans (Besley & Coate 1995; Armendáriz de Aghion 1999; Ghatak & Guinnane 1999). If one 45 
member of the group cannot make a payment on her loan, the other members of the solidarity 46 
group are responsible for pitching in to help her make that payment. The consequences of the 47 
group failing to bail out the delinquent member are severe: if one member defaults, the entire 48 
group is considered in default and all group members are excluded from the possibility of future 49 
loans. 50 
 51 
The solidarity group model of microlending has been very successful in Bangladesh and other 52 
South Asian countries where it originated (Yunus 2007). However, as solidarity group lending 53 
became the modal microlending method across the world—nearly 2/3 of microcredit borrowers 54 
receive loans structured in this way (Hermes & Lensink 2007)—it became clear that the success 55 
of solidarity groups in South Asia was due to more than just the lending model.  56 
 57 
Of course, which outcomes ought to be emphasized as indexing success—e.g., poverty 58 
reduction, savings, well-being broadly construed, women’s empowerment, education, etc. 59 
(Karlan & Zinman 2011; Banerjee, Duflo, et al. 2015)—and how to measure those outcomes, are 60 
topics of debate (Awaworyi Churchill & Nuhu 2016; Odell 2010). Further, evidence that 61 
microloans have a positive impact on such local outcomes is quite mixed, both within and 62 
between studies (Pitt & Khandker 1998; Khandker 2005; Morduch & Haley 2002; Banerjee, 63 
Duflo, et al. 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, et al. 2015; Karlan & Zinman 2009; Chemin 2008; 64 
Duvendack & Palmer-Jones 2012; Attanasio et al. 2015). Looking beyond local impact, others 65 
have examined the effects of microlending on macroeconomic outcomes, like inequality, and 66 
found favorable effects (Hisako & Shigeyuki 2009). One outcome MFIs and policy makers 67 
attend to is default rates, because achieving sufficiently low default rates is important for 68 
financial sustainability. Here, we will examine the psychology that underlies microloan default 69 
and the high variation in default rates across countries that has been observed. An understanding 70 
of such variation in default rates, and their underlying psychology, could aid MFIs and policy 71 
makers as they decide how to structure loans (e.g., joint versus individual liability loans) across 72 
borrower pools. 73 
 74 
There is significant country-level variation, F(118, 11601) = 12.15, p < 0.001, and region-level 75 
variation, F(5, 11601) = 63.11, p < 0.001, in default rates (see Figure 1 below), with banks in 76 
many countries facing default rates high enough to keep microlending from being self-sustaining 77 
(i.e. functioning without reliance on charitable donations; Hermes & Lensink 2011). 78 
 79 
 80 
 81 
 82 
Figure 1. There is clear variation across countries in microloan default rates, and default rates 83 
can be extremely high. Each bar represents the mean default rates of banks in a given country 84 
during 2009, which range from 0% to over 40%. Countries are grouped into five regions, 85 
represented by different colored bars (Middle East includes North Africa).  86 
 87 
Repayment theories 88 
 89 
What causes defaults, and how can lenders and policy makers reduce defaults where they are 90 
prevalent? Most research on microcredit has tried to explain why individuals make any 91 
contributions to repay the microloan at all—since loans to solidarity groups are both 92 
uncollateralized and susceptible to free-riding, why do individuals not shirk on their payments, 93 
leading to high default rates across the board (Stiglitz 1990; Besley & Coate 1995; Armendáriz 94 
de Aghion 1999; Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch 2000; Morduch 1999; Wydick 2001; Field 95 
& Pande 2008)?  96 
 97 
One set of answers propose that the collateralization and free-rider problems can both be 98 
addressed by collateralizing the social capital that exists within and outside borrower groups. For 99 
example, borrowers who would face external sanctions in the event of a default are incentivized 100 
to repay their microloans (Besley & Coate 1995), as are those who face within group peer 101 
pressure and sanctioning (Paxton, Graham, & Thraen 2000). Others, however, have emphasized 102 
the role of harmonious social relationships, both internal and external to borrower groups, in 103 
fostering (rather than coercing) repayment (Griffin & Husted 2015). Another set of repayment 104 
theories suggest that peer monitoring and screening (e.g., requiring character references for 105 
prospective borrowers) can allow solidarity groups to exclude unreliable borrowers who take on 106 
too much risk (Stiglitz 1990) or who are characteristically unlikely to repay their loans 107 
(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch 2005), and thus achieve better outcomes (Banerjee et al. 108 
1994). Similarly, borrowers may learn useful business strategies from peers who are already 109 
successful through mentorship programs, thereby reducing defaults that may be caused by 110 
inexperienced entrepreneurs who learn by trial and error (Barboza & Barreto 2006). 111 
 112 
Inequity aversion in microloans 113 
 114 
Many of the repayment theories described above provide compelling solutions to the free-rider 115 
problem: both social capital and peer monitoring create incentives to cooperate, as does the 116 
“shadow of the future” (Bó 2005) cast by the basic repeated interaction structure of microloans 117 
and the possibility of peer punishment (Czura 2015).  118 
 119 
Here, we propose that there is another factor that can drive default rates, even in contexts where 120 
the free-rider problem has been resolved by social capital, peer monitoring, and repeated game 121 
effects: how people respond when others are unable to make their payments. That is, what 122 
determines if people are willing or unwilling to pitch in extra when someone else in their 123 
solidarity group cannot afford to pay his or her full installment? Given that borrowers are 124 
typically living under conditions of extreme poverty, they are highly susceptible to income 125 
shocks (Morduch 1994). Thus, even in the absence of free-riding, people will sometimes fail to 126 
make their full payments just due to chance and misfortune, and it is essential for a solidary 127 
group’s survival that others are willing to chip in to cover these shortfalls. 128 
 129 
Put differently, in solidarity group lending, groups don’t simply default because a group member 130 
can’t make her payment; groups default when the rest of the group cannot, or will not, bail out 131 
those members who are unable to make their full payments. From this perspective, an important 132 
question is therefore: what makes a borrower refuse to pay a small cost to bail out another group 133 
member, even when doing so causes her to incur the much larger cost of foregoing all future 134 
loans?  135 
 136 
Here, we shed light on microfinance defaults by leveraging the fact that this question, in a 137 
slightly different form, has received a great deal of attention in the behavioral economics 138 
literature using the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, a “proposer” makes an offer of how to 139 
split a sum of money with a “responder”. The responder can either accept, or reject in which case 140 
neither player receives anything. When a responder rejects a low (but non-zero) offer, she is 141 
forgoing the offered amount in order to reduce the proposer’s payoff. Although this behavior is 142 
inconsistent with rational self-interest, a large body of empirical evidence shows that many 143 
people do indeed reject low offers in 1-shot anonymous UGs (Camerer 2003), even when the 144 
stakes are quite high (e.g. 1 month’s salary; Andersen et al. 2011). This evidence suggests that 145 
people derive disutility from receiving less than a normative “fair share” from an exchange (i.e. 146 
show “disadvantageous inequity aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt 1999)), and thus are willing to pay 147 
costs to obtain a result that is considered more fair – even when doing so reduces everyone’s 148 
earnings. 149 
 150 
Our key argument is that inequity aversion – the same psychology that causes UG rejections – 151 
leads borrowers to refuse to bail out delinquent members of their solidarity group, despite the 152 
long-run individual costs of allowing the group to default. To see why, consider the differences 153 
between a money-maximizing and an inequity averse decision-maker in a stylized conceptual 154 
model of the microloan interaction among the members of a solidarity group.  155 
 156 
We consider a stochastically repeated game. In each period of the microloan interaction, each 157 
member of the solidarity group receives an endowment, and decides how much to contribute to 158 
the group’s repayment effort. The group must reach a total level of contribution of at least ! in 159 
order to avoid default. If the group defaults, all members are excluded from any future loans, and 160 
thus earn payoff 0 in all subsequent periods. If the group does not default, they can continue on 161 
in the next period, and each group member " earns expected payoff #$, which is a function of the 162 
continuation probability (i.e. the likelihood that the group does not disband for reasons other than 163 
default), the income distribution across the group members, the default threshold	!, and the 164 
strategies of the other group members. Our argument will hold regardless of the functional form 165 
of #. We will assume that if a group member fails to make the full payment on her loan, falling 166 
short by & units, the game enters the “pitching in” stage. In this stage, each of the non-delinquent 167 
group members in turn are given the opportunity to pitch in & units to make the group compliant. 168 
If the first non-delinquent group member pitches in enough that the threshold is met, the game 169 
continues to the next period. If not, the choice passes to the next non-delinquent member. If the 170 
non-delinquent group members fail to pitch in enough, the group defaults. 171 
 172 
A player’s strategy in this game therefore constitutes their choice of how much to contribute in 173 
the contribution stage, and whether to pitch in the required units in the pitching in stage. Given 174 
that the game is repeated, conditional strategies are possible in which choices in each stage 175 
depend on the outcome of previous rounds. For simplicity, however, we focus on a single 176 
decision (unconditional strategy) in the pitching in stage, facing the final non-delinquent group 177 
member in the case where all other non-delinquent group members have elected not to pitch in. 178 
A money maximizing player will pitch in & as long as #$ 	> 	&; that is, if the individual benefits 179 
to that player of the group persisting are greater than the cost of pitching in. 180 
 181 
Those who show disadvantageous inequity aversion, however, incur a psychological cost when 182 
others earn more than them – and pitching in necessarily causes one to earn less than the other 183 
non-delinquent group members who do not pitch in, as well as the delinquent player in the case 184 
that delinquency is due to free-riding rather than an inability to contribute1. Let ($ be the 185 
inequity-aversion-related disutility that pitching in & units causes for group member ". Thus, an 186 
inequity averse group member will contribute if #$ > & + ($  holds. As a result, the more 187 
inequity averse a player is, the larger the expected monetary benefit from the group avoiding 188 
default must be in order for her to prefer pitching in to letting the group fail. Thus, just as 189 
inequity averse decision-makers are less likely to accept unfair offers in the UG than money-190 
maximizers, inequity averse decision-makers are also less likely to pitch in when their microloan 191 
group falls short of its repayment threshold, leading to greater likelihood of default in groups of 192 
inequity averse players. 193 
 194 
In this paper, we provide empirical and experimental support for this proposed connection 195 
between inequity aversion as indicated by UG rejections and microloan default. In doing so, we 196 
aim to shed new light on why solidarity group microloans fail, what explains cross-country 197 
variation in such failures, and what approaches might be employed to reduce such failures. 198 
 199 
 200 
Empirical data 201 
 202 
Methods 203 
 204 
To provide initial empirical support for the argument that inequity aversion plays a role in 205 
determining solidarity group success, and in explaining cross-country variation in default rates, 206 
we used several publicly available data sources to compile our dataset for the microcredit 207 
outcomes analyses. These sources include the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) (MIX 208 
Market 2008), the World Values Survey trust index (World Values Survey Association 2009), 209 
the Global Barometer Survey (Global Barometer 2009), economic games data from dozens of 210 
countries compiled in two meta-analyses one for Ultimatum Game (UG) (Oosterbeek et al. 2004) 211 
and one for Trust Game (TG) (Johnson & Mislin 2008), and the World Bank database for GDP, 212 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, Gini index and poverty data (World Bank Group 2012). For any 213 
                                               
1 We note that how borrowers form beliefs about whether others are free-riding is relevant to the 
decision-making process, but it is beyond the scope of this model. 
given analysis, we included all countries for which we had microfinance outcomes during the 214 
relevant time span and the corresponding predictor variables. 215 
 216 
All the data regarding the performance and makeup of MFIs were obtained through the MIX 217 
(MIX Market 2008). The MIX is an online database founded in 2002, which makes available a 218 
variety of data from thousands of MFIs in most of the world’s developing nations. Through the 219 
MIX, we procured rates of at-risk portfolios, loan portfolio yields, percentage of women 220 
borrowers and a number of other indicators relevant to these and other analyses. Most notably, 221 
the percentage of women borrowers is of interest as a predicting variable based on fieldwork 222 
done by D'Espallier and colleagues (D’espallier et al. 2011), which showed that homogeneity of 223 
group gender composition predicted lower default rates2.  224 
 225 
Because MFIs have varying accounting practices when dealing with unpaid loans, the MIX 226 
reports the value of loans that are at risk, meaning having at least one installment past due for 227 
more than 30 days3. This includes the value of unpaid principle, both past and future, but not 228 
accrued interest, and is standardized by dividing the at-risk loan value by the MFI's gross 229 
portfolio value. This is the standard proxy used for default rates in microlending. The ‘real yield 230 
on gross portfolio’ indicator is the ratio of interest and fees on the loan portfolio to the average 231 
gross loan portfolio, controlling for inflation, and so acts as a proxy for interest rates. The 232 
percentage of borrowers who are female is calculated by dividing the number of female 233 
borrowers by the total number of borrowers.  234 
 235 
Over the last 30 years, there have been six waves of World Values Survey collected in almost 236 
100 countries. The full survey captures many attitudes, but our primary interest were those 237 
pertaining to trustworthiness and civic cooperation. The trust question of interest is: “Generally 238 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 239 
dealing with people?”. Participants then choose between “Most people can be trusted” and “You 240 
                                               
2 Although none of the MFIs in our sample had less than 50% female borrowers, making it impossible to determine 
the effect of having male dominated groups, we do find a relationship between the percentage of borrowers who are 
female and default rates that is consistent with D'Espallier et al. 
3 Here we use portfolios at risk at 30 days because this is the most commonly reported measure in the MIX, and 
therefore has the most reliable and robust data. Unfortunately, complete default data is not available. 
can never be too careful when dealing with others”. The Trust Index is calculated as: Trust Index 241 
= 100 + (% Most people can be trusted) - (% Can´t be too careful). For the regressions presented 242 
in Table S3, we augmented the World Values Survey trust index data with data from the Global 243 
Barometer Survey, which asks, among other questions, the exact trust index question asked by 244 
the World Values Survey. We added trust index values from a few countries for which we had 245 
UG and MIX data, but no World Values Survey trust index data in order to keep our sample at 246 
the maximum possible size. Beyond the trust index, we also used three questions from the World 247 
Values Survey to determine what other researchers (Herrmann et al. 2008) have called ‘civic 248 
cooperation’. Civic cooperation measure attitudes towards tax evasion, abuse of social welfare 249 
programs, and dodging fares on public transportation (literal free-riding). This composite has 250 
been shown to be strongly predictive of cooperation (anti-free-riding) behavior (Herrmann et al. 251 
2008). 252 
 253 
Although surveys yield important information about how people expect themselves and others to 254 
behave, they do not always reveal strategies in the way economic games do. In order to 255 
distinguish between attitudinal and behavioral trust, trustworthiness, and tendency to punish, we 256 
use cross-cultural economic games data. UG and TG data were taken from the meta-analyses 257 
mentioned above that were designed to be sensitive to cross-cultural differences in the playing of 258 
these games, and so the criteria for inclusion between the meta-analyses were similar. 259 
 260 
We also pulled democracy ranking and corruption ranking data from the World Audit (World 261 
Audit 2016) as well as rule of law data from the World Justice Project (Agrast 2013). Lastly, 262 
Gini index, GDP per capita, GDP and GDP growth were gathered from the World Bank database 263 
which collects a number of developmental indicators dating from 1960. 264 
 265 
We restrict our analyses to 2007 and after, because prior to that year there is little data on which 266 
loan structures are most prevalent. The MIX does not collect data on loan structure, but an 267 
empirical survey from 2007 (Hermes & Lensink 2007) found that approximately 2/3 of 268 
borrowers at that time received solidarity group loans. So, for that reason, we have restricted our 269 
analyses to after 2007 in order to be sure that we are looking at microlending outcomes that 270 
reflect the relevant loan structure of solidarity groups. 271 
 272 
Results 273 
 274 
We find that the UG rejection rate in a given country is strongly correlated with that country’s 275 
microloan default rate (r = 0.81, p < 0.001; Figure 2; averaging default rates across the period 276 
2007-2014). This relationship held for all but one of the individual years in that eight-year range, 277 
and was robust to (i) controlling for UG offers (to partially address the fact that we are analyzing 278 
overall rejection rates and not minimum acceptable offers); (ii) controlling for a set of economic 279 
development indicators including GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, and Gini; (iii) analyzing 280 
the data at the bank level rather than the country level data; and (iv) excluding Papua New 281 
Guinea (an extreme value). See supplement for details and further analyses using additional 282 
indicators mentioned above. 283 
 284 
Conversely, we found no evidence that defaults were negatively related to prosociality (i.e. 285 
associated with free-riding), using various different measures (Peysakhovich et al. 2014). First, 286 
we combined default rate data with a different cross-cultural dataset of Trust Game play in 18 287 
countries (Johnson & Mislin 2008), and found a non-robust association in the opposite direction, 288 
with default rates being (if anything) positively correlated with trust, r = 0.559, p = 0.016, and 289 
trustworthiness, r = 0.392, p = 0.107, but these relationships failed to reach conventional 290 
significance levels when including economic controls, p > 0.05 for both. Second, we combined 291 
default rate data with the World Values Survey (56 countries in both World Values Survey and 292 
default rate dataset), and found no correlation between default rates and trust, r = -0.154, p = 293 
0.245, or strength of civic norms of cooperation, r = 0.056, p = 0.682, both of which are often 294 
used as proxies for prosociality (Herrmann et al. 2008; Peysakhovich et al. 2014). See 295 
supplement for additional analyses.  296 
 297 
 298 
Figure 2. Microloan default rates are strongly correlated with Ultimatum Game rejection rates 299 
across countries. Shown are country-level default rates averaged across an 8-year span (2007-300 
2014). UG rejection rates are highly correlated with default rates, r= 0.812, p < 0.001, R2 = 301 
66%. 95% confidence intervals are shown for the regression line. 302 
 303 
 304 
The fact that UG rejections predict cross-cultural variation in microcredit default rates, while 305 
prosociality does not, supports our emphasis on borrowers’ responses to others’ behavior above 306 
any beyond borrowers’ own inclination towards cooperation versus free-riding. Of course, these 307 
kinds of cross-sectional analyses must be taken with a grain of salt because they suffer from all 308 
the typical limitations inherent in correlational analyses and borrower populations may differ 309 
from the populations surveyed on relevant dimensions. However, we do take these results as 310 
suggestive of a mechanism—inequity aversion—that is not typically discussed in the 311 
microlending context (but see Griffin & Husted 2015 for some hints of this). 312 
 313 
Experimental Data 314 
 315 
Methods 316 
 317 
To provide further evidence for this interpretation of microloan defaults, we complement this 318 
field data with an individual-level, online laboratory experiment. In this experiment, we place 319 
participants into groups and examine the relationship between Ultimatum Game Minimum 320 
Acceptable Offers (UG MAOs; the lowest offer someone would be willing to accept) within the 321 
group, and the group’s behavior in a novel economic game, the Microloan Game, that we 322 
developed. In the game theoretic tradition, the Microloan Game is an abstraction that, while it 323 
omits many elements of real-world solidarity group-based microcredit, aims to capture the key 324 
strategic features of such interactions: that (i) players are engaged in a repeated, potentially 325 
lucrative group endeavor that requires regular financial investment (i.e. loan repayment) to 326 
continue; (ii) that some group members are either unable or unwilling to make that investment in 327 
any given period, leading to shortfalls; and (iii) that when such shortfalls occur, other group 328 
members can pitch in more money to make up the shortfall. 329 
 330 
Specifically, in the Microloan Game, participants played a repeated game in groups of three. 331 
Each round of the Microloan Game consisted of two stages. (Although we herein describe the 332 
game in terms related to microcredit loan payments, the game was presented to participants in 333 
neutral language without any mention of loans, debt, or repayment.)  334 
 335 
Upon entering the study, participants were randomly assigned to a group, and each group was 336 
randomly assigned to a condition. In Stage 1, each of the three group members was given a 337 
random initial endowment representing their income in a given loan period (between 20 and 500 338 
monetary units, MUs, with an average of 340 MUs; the random endowment allocation procedure 339 
is described in more detail below). Each group member then decided how much of that 340 
endowment to keep for themselves versus contribute to the group, representing their decision 341 
regarding repayment of their microloan debt. Participants were informed that each of the three 342 
group members was required to contribute 200 MUs per round in order to avoid group default. If 343 
fewer than 600 MUs in total (200 MUs per member) were contributed, the contribution threshold 344 
was not met and the game entered Stage 2.  345 
 346 
In Stage 2, all players were told the number of additional MUs required to meet the contribution 347 
threshold, and they were given the opportunity (in random order) to “pitch in” more units if they 348 
chose to do so. Participants could not waste MUs by over-contributing, and were aware of this 349 
fact because pitching in was done sequentially and the remaining balance due was displayed, and 350 
participants could not use earnings from past rounds to cover the shortfall of the current round.  351 
 352 
If the 600 MU goal was not reached by the end of Stage 2, the game ended and no further 353 
earnings were possible (i.e. the group defaulted on their loan). If at least 600 MUs were 354 
contributed (either directly in Stage 1, or by the end of Stage 2), the game had the chance to 355 
continue on for another round (in the absence of default, the game lasted 8 rounds for certain, 356 
and then transitioned to a stochastically repeated game with 50% continuation probability; as per 357 
a randomization scheme presented in (Bó & Fréchette 2011)). The order in which participants 358 
pitched in was randomized and participants were not informed of the order in which group 359 
members were given the opportunity to pitch in (although they did always know the outstanding 360 
amount needed to reach the continuation threshold), and thus the only way of given player could 361 
be certain that the group would avoid default would be to pitch in the full amount required 362 
themselves. As a result, players had some personal incentive to make sure the group met its 600 363 
MU contribution goal, in order to be able to earn more units in future rounds4; but also had the 364 
opportunity to free-ride by contributing less than 200 MUs with the hope that others would make 365 
up the difference. Critically, however, participants did not know whether lack of contribution by 366 
other players was due to the inability to contribute (because of a small endowment), or just due 367 
to free-riding. 368 
 369 
Solidarity groups are often faced with the situation in which one or more members are unable to 370 
pay, as income for the typical participant is highly variable (Dercon 2002; Morduch 1994). To 371 
incorporate this into our lab Microloan Game, we forced incomes to differ between players and 372 
across rounds of the game: while each participant received an average of 340 MUs each round, 373 
each received a different randomly-sampled amount. In particular, the sampling was designed 374 
such that one player each round received fewer than 200 MUs, and thus was unable to repay their 375 
share of the 600 MU contribution goal. Players were informed only that in each round they 376 
                                               
4 The Microloan Game has a similar strategic structure to a multiplayer snowdrift/anti-coordination game, or step-
level public goods game (Croson & Marks 2000). These games include equilibria with non-zero contribution levels, 
and it is in this sense that we mean that a personal incentive may exist for money-maximizers to contribute. 
would receive a randomly determined endowment of between 0 and 500 MUs, and were given 377 
no information about the endowments of the other players or the manner in which endowments 378 
were generated (modeling the real-world ambiguity regarding others’ incomes). Thus, even in 379 
the absence of any free-riding, avoiding default in the Microloan Game depended on (at least) 380 
one of the two higher-endowment players contributing more than 200 MUs each round, despite 381 
not knowing how many MUs the other participants received – and thus having uncertainty about 382 
whether others’ non-contribution was driven by free-riding or bad luck. In keeping with common 383 
practice in experimental economics, and in order to have a unidimensional focus on inequity, we 384 
shuffled participant IDs between each round. That is, because we shuffled participant IDs 385 
between each round, we allowed participants to act on a motivation to avoid disadvantageous 386 
inequity without introducing complexities that arise from the presence of reputation. Of course, 387 
this reduces the ecological validity of the game, but makes it more straightforward to make 388 
inferences about the role of disadvantageous inequity aversion in microlending. See supplement 389 
for experimental instructions. 390 
 391 
We hypothesized that, as with real-world solidarity groups, there would be substantial variance 392 
in default rates across our experimental groups in the Microloan Game, and that the psychology 393 
of inequity aversion would play a major role in explaining this variation. To test this hypothesis, 394 
we had participants play a UG prior to the beginning of the Microloan Game. In the UG, 395 
participants made decisions in both roles (specifying an offer as Player 1, and a minimal 396 
acceptable offer, MAO, below which they would reject as Player 2). Players did not receive 397 
feedback on the UG’s outcome until the experiment was complete to prevent contamination 398 
effects; half of participants were assigned to be Player 1, the other half Player 2, and payment 399 
was determined on random pairings after the fact. 400 
 401 
We predicted that a group’s likelihood of defaulting in the Microloan Game would be 402 
determined by the UG MAOs of its members. In particular, because the group’s shortfall could 403 
typically be made up (and default avoided) by just one group member chipping in the extra 404 
amount, what matters for preventing defaults is the least inequity averse group member – or, put 405 
differently, the failure of a group in the Microloan Game should be predicted by the lowest MAO 406 
among its members. The higher the lowest MAO in a group is, the less likely someone will be 407 
willing to chip in, and the less likely the group will be to succeed (predicting a positive 408 
relationship between Microloan Game default and minimum MAO in the group).  409 
 410 
Recall that above, when we compared how money-maximizing and inequity averse decision-411 
makers treat the solidarity group interaction, we showed that money-maximizers ought to be 412 
more likely to both accept low offers in the UG (i.e., have low MAOs) and more likely to pitch 413 
in to meet a threshold in a game like the Microloan Game than inequity averse decision-makers. 414 
This allows us to predict Microloan Game outcomes at the group level using individual level 415 
preferences elicited using the UG.  416 
 417 
Finally, we assessed the robustness of this prediction regarding the importance of inequity 418 
aversion for Microloan Game default with a second experimental condition designed to 419 
accomplish two goals. First, we wanted to “stack the deck” in favor of the importance of free-420 
riding by emphasizing the social dilemma dimension of the Microloan Game. Second, we 421 
wanted to show that, because inequity averse decision-makers already view the Microloan Game 422 
as a social dilemma (and money-maximizers are already prepared to pitch in when the value of 423 
the game continuing is greater than the cost of pitching in), framing the game as a social 424 
dilemma should not affect the relationship between inequity aversion and game play. In this 425 
“Social Dilemma” condition, the game was expressly framed as a collective goods problem: 426 
players were told that the group as a whole was required to contribute 600 MUs per round (and 427 
the group could, one member at a time, pitch in to cover short-falls), in contrast to the baseline 428 
condition where players were told they were individually responsible for contributing 200 MUs 429 
each (and could individually pitch in).  430 
 431 
To test these predictions, we recruited 360 U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 432 
(Mage = 34.99, 71% female; Mechanical Turk offers a subject pool that is much more diverse 433 
than just college undergraduates; Horton et al. 2011) to play the UG and the Microloan Game. In 434 
line with standard MTurk wages, participants were paid a show-up fee plus a bonus based on 435 
their earnings in the game, using an exchange rate of 10 MUs per cent. A randomization check 436 
indicated that UG MAOs did not differ significantly between participants randomized into the 437 
Baseline versus Social Dilemma condition in the Microloan game (Ranksum, z = 1.303, p = 438 
.193). The mean UG MAO was 67 MUs, and the distribution had modes at 100 and 50, and 20% 439 
of MAOs were at or below 40. 440 
 441 
All analyses are conducted at the level of the 3-player Microloan Game group, with one 442 
observation per group. We consider three different measures of a group’s (lack of) success: 443 
whether the group defaulted at any point in the game, whether the group defaulted in the very 444 
first round, and the fraction of total rounds in which the group was in default which was 445 
determined by dividing the number of completed rounds by the number of possible rounds 446 
determined by the stopping algorithm described above. We then predict these measures using the 447 
level of inequity aversion of the least inequity averse group member (i.e. the lowest UG MAO of 448 
the three group members): as described above, because it only takes one person to pitch in to the 449 
save the group from default, what matters is the unwillingness of the least unwilling group 450 
member. For the binary Microloan Game failure measures, we use logistic regression, and for the 451 
continuous failure measure we use OLS regression with robust standard errors; all coefficients 452 
for continuous variables are standardized.  453 
 454 
Results 455 
 456 
As expected, we observed a positive relationship between a group’s failure in the Microloan 457 
Game and the group’s minimum UG MAO (whether the group defaulted at any point in the 458 
game, β = 0.64, SE = 0.24, p = 0.008; whether the group defaulted in the very first round, β = 459 
0.61, SE = 0.22, p = 0.006; fraction of total rounds in which the group was in default, β = 0.09, 460 
SE = 0.04, p = 0.028). See Table 1 and Figure 3. This suggests that a group defaults when the 461 
least inequity averse group member’s willingness to incur costly punishment is sufficiently high 462 
– that is, when no group members are willing to pitch in because they are all too inequity averse. 463 
We also observed a significant effect of the Social Dilemma frame on Microloan Game group 464 
failure (whether the group defaulted at any point, β = 1.59, SE = 0.48, p < 0.001, whether the 465 
group defaulted in the first round, β = 1.31, SE = 0.44, p = 0.003; fraction of total rounds in 466 
which the group was in default, β = 0.28, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001). This serves as a manipulation 467 
check confirming that our Social Dilemma frame successfully induced greater free-riding. 468 
Critically, however, there was no significant interaction between minimum UG MAO and 469 
condition (whether the group defaulted at any point, β = 0.03, SE = 0.54, p = 0.951; whether the 470 
group defaulted in the very first round, β = 0.06, SE = 0.45, p = 0.888; fraction of total rounds in 471 
which the group was not in default, β = 0.04, SE = 0.08, p = 0.639). This shows that the MAO 472 
relationship was robust to emphasizing the social dilemma component of the Microloan Game.  473 
 474 
Table 1. Regression results from the experimental data. Participants were more likely to default 475 
at some point (specifications 1 and 2) and in the first round (specifications 3 and 4) if their 476 
group minimum MAO was higher. Similarly, groups with higher minimum MAOs failed to 477 
complete more rounds. Specifications 1-4 were fit using logistic regression; specifications 5-6 478 
were fit using OLS regression. Coefficients are standardized and group-clustered standard 479 
errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 480 
 481 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Defaulted at any point Defaulted in first round Fraction of rounds foregone 
              
Group minimum MAO 0.64*** 0.63** 0.61*** 0.57* 0.09** 0.10* 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.22) (0.34) (0.04) (0.06) 
Condition (Social dilemma=1) 1.59*** 1.60*** 1.31*** 1.29*** 0.28*** 0.27** 
 (0.48) (0.53) (0.44) (0.44) (0.07) (0.07) 
Group minimum MAO x Condition  0.03  0.06  0.04 
  (0.54)  (0.45)  (0.08) 
Constant 0.39 0.39 1.32*** 1.30*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.35) (0.06) (0.06) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 11.8% 11.9% 9.2% 9.2% 12.2% 12.4% 
 482 
Thus, our Microloan Game results demonstrate that the positive relationship between UG MAO 483 
and microcredit defaults shown in the cross-cultural data extends to the much more controlled 484 
environment of a laboratory game using just American participants, and applies at the level of 485 
individual psychology (rather than, for example, just tracking some other group-level cultural 486 
trait in the cross-cultural dataset). That is, although there are clear identification issues with the 487 
model we fit to the cross-cultural data in the previous section, the fact that we observe the same 488 
pattern in the lab at the individual level supports our theoretical claim regarding inequity 489 
aversion and microloan default. 490 
 491 
Figure 3. Ultimatum Game MAOs are positively related to failure in the laboratory Microloan 492 
Game, both in the baseline and social dilemma conditions. Shown is the MAO of the least 493 
inequity averse group member (i.e. group member with the lowest MAO) average across all 494 
groups who either never default, did not default in the first round but eventually defaulted in a 495 
later round, or defaulted in the first round; groups from the baseline condition are shown in red, 496 
and from the social dilemma condition in blue. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.   497 
 498 
While the results from this individual-level experiment are what we expected based on our 499 
inequity aversion model of the microloan interaction, there are limitations of the experiments that 500 
are important to acknowledge. We noted above that we stripped away some important features of 501 
solidarity group lending in an effort to isolate the role of inequity aversion in the microloan 502 
interaction. In particular, we did not allow participants to track the behavior of specific 503 
individuals (which would have made negative reciprocity possible), and we did not allow 504 
communication. By removing these features from the interaction, we were able to isolate the role 505 
of inequity aversion, but removing such features also has the potential to reduce the external 506 
validity of the experiment. Furthermore, our main goal in this experiment (and in the model 507 
described above) was to compare the behavior of money-maximizers and those who are inequity 508 
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averse, but other motivators are likely to also play a role (e.g. altruism). Furthermore, the 509 
subjects used in our experiment (Americans on MTurk) are quite different in many ways from 510 
typical participants in microloans. Future work should explore how inequity aversion interacts 511 
with reciprocity and communication in microloans, the role of other motivations for default, and 512 
the generalizability of results beyond our particular subject pool.  513 
 514 
We would also like to note some other limitations of this work raised during the review process. 515 
For example, because the MIX does not contain loan methodology, our microfinance outcomes 516 
come from banks that use a variety of loan types, some of which do not use joint liability. While 517 
this should only make our estimates of the relationship between inequity aversion and default 518 
more conservative, it is worth noting nonetheless. It is also the case that many of the variables 519 
we pulled from the WVS include responses from demographics that are not the target for 520 
microloans; namely the rural and working poor. Similarly, while our measure of default (PAR 521 
30) is a useful proxy, having a longer-term at-risk measure would be helpful to test the longevity 522 
of inequity aversion (i.e., given sufficient time, do inequity averse individuals cool-off and 523 
eventually pitch in?). 524 
 525 
Discussion 526 
 527 
Here we have provided evidence that a key determinant of the success of solidarity group 528 
lending—the predominant model of microlending—is people’s willingness to overcome inequity 529 
aversion and pitch in when other group members fail to make their payments. As such, we find 530 
that variation in inequity aversion (as measured by UG rejections) and not variation in 531 
cooperativeness (captured by a variety of measures) is strongly predictive of default rates across 532 
countries. In addition, this relationship is also evident in the psychology of individuals: in a 533 
laboratory model of microcredit, groups with individuals having higher UG MAOs (i.e., more 534 
inequity averse) are more likely to default.  535 
 536 
Our observation that the psychology of inequity aversion plays such an important role in driving 537 
defaults rates has important policy implications. With this perspective, it becomes possible to 538 
leverage the large body of work in behavioral economics regarding the motivations of UG 539 
rejection to design default-reduction interventions.  540 
 541 
For example, there is considerable evidence that “cool-off” periods, in which responders are 542 
asked to wait for several minutes or overnight before responding to offers, dramatically reduce 543 
rejections in the UG (Oechssler et al. 2013; Grimm & Mengel 2011; Neo et al. 2013; Oechssler 544 
et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2011). Instituting an analogous cool-off period for borrowers at risk of 545 
defaulting would be easy to do and free to implement: in the event that a borrower cannot make 546 
her payment, either during the course of repayment or at the end of the loan period, the loan 547 
officer would leave and return the next day once the group has had a chance to cool-off and 548 
consider the consequences of not pitching in. If such an intervention were to be successful in 549 
reducing avoidable defaults, microfinance institutions would stand a better chance of becoming 550 
self-sustaining. 551 
 552 
Secondly, it has been shown that reputation concerns can provide a rationale for rejecting in the 553 
UG, in order to induce others to offer more in the future (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Thus, it 554 
may be advantageous for microfinance institutions to minimize the opportunity for such 555 
incentives. For example, to the extent that borrowers who refuse to pitch in do so because they 556 
don’t want to be seen as the kind of person who can be taken advantage of (Thaler 1988), 557 
allowing borrowers to pitch in for others’ loans anonymously would allow for those who want to 558 
help others to do so without any reputational repercussions. In general, any procedural change 559 
that removes cues to reputation for the pitching in phase (but not the initial contribution phase) 560 
should retain the feature necessary for avoiding free-riding while reducing the motivation to hold 561 
out when pitching in is possible. 562 
 563 
In the decades since the solidarity group model of microlending came into existence, it has 564 
spread to many millions of borrowers in most of the world’s developing nations. But this 565 
spreading didn’t take into account the psychological variation across societies, and the one-size-566 
fits-all approach to microlending has run into sustainability issues (Hermes & Lensink 2011). 567 
Microfinance institutions, and therefore their borrowers, stand to benefit from a deeper 568 
understanding of the psychology that makes microcredit work where it works and fail where it 569 
fails.   570 
 571 
Human subjects approval 572 
These studies complied with all ethical regulations for the use of human subjects, and approval 573 
for the study was provided by the Human Subject Committee at Yale University.   574 
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Supplementary Information 
 
Additional analyses: empirics 
 
Yearly country-level analyses 
 
Table S1. Ultimatum Game rejection rates, not offers, predict defaults 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
VARIABLES Portfolios at risk 
                  
Offers 0.112 0.206 0.130 0.114 0.120 0.0684 -0.0668 -0.164 
 (0.217) (0.158) (0.133) (0.259) (0.142) (0.173) (0.357) (0.278) 
Rejections 0.282* 0.215* 0.507*** 0.432** 0.318*** 0.0530 0.683** 0.426** 
 (0.137) (0.100) (0.0841) (0.165) (0.0899) (0.111) (0.228) (0.176) 
Constant -0.00650 -0.0277 -0.000869 -0.00600 -0.000738 0.0331 0.0422 0.106 
 (0.0857) (0.0624) (0.0524) (0.103) (0.0560) (0.0689) (0.142) (0.110) 
         
Observations 12 12 12 13 12 13 13 12 
R-squared 34.8% 44.2% 81.4% 42.3% 61.2% 4.1% 47.3% 39.9% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table S1 above shows that in each year (except 2012), UG rejection rates are highly predictive 
of default rates while offers are not. When we excluded Papua New Guinea, rejection rates were 
still predictive, β = 0.238, SE = 0.092, p = 0.030, R2 = 43%, and offers remained unpredictive, β 
= 0.074, SE = 0.130, p = 0.605, R2 = 5%. Further, there is no World Values Survey trust index 
data for Papua New Guinea, which means that specifications 2-10 of Table S2 all exclude Papua 
New Guinea, yet still replicate the relationship between UG rejection rates and default rates. 
Further, for those concerned that including both offers and rejection rates in the same model is 
problematic, our results hold when we examine either independent variable on its own. In 
particular, collapsing across the 8-year period, we find no effect of UG offers on default rates, β 
= 0.128, SE = 0.210, p = 0.555, R2 = 3%, but a strong effect of UG rejection rates, β = 0.367, SE 
= 0.130, p = 0.080, R2 = 66%. 
 
  
Bank-level analyses 
 
Table S2. Bank-level analysis predicting defaults using Ultimatum Game play 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Portfolios at risk 
                      
Offer 0.0962 0.0517 0.0465 0.0801 0.0582 0.0296 0.0756 -0.0343 0.0787 0.0593 
 (0.104) (0.0938) (0.102) (0.0941) (0.0999) (0.0972) (0.0886) (0.0949) (0.0905) (0.0365) 
Rejections 0.433** 0.232** 0.257*** 0.236** 0.252*** 0.228*** 0.251*** 0.321**** 0.198** 0.233**** 
 (0.134) (0.0870) (0.0707) (0.0816) (0.0655) (0.0651) (0.0652) (0.0759) (0.0633) (0.0280) 
WVS trust  0.0417 0.0327 0.0265 0.0205 0.0353 0.0317 0.0849*** 0.00897 -0.0351 
  (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0195) (0.0236) (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0316) (0.0549) 
% female   -0.0902** -0.0959* -0.0905** -0.0900** -0.0896** -0.0912** -0.0971* -0.0982* 
   (0.0311) (0.0399) (0.0315) (0.0308) (0.0313) (0.0282) (0.0399) (0.0390) 
Yield    0.0252     0.0274 0.0352 
    (0.0405)     (0.0411) (0.0565) 
GDP (trillions)     0.0163    0.0323 0.206** 
     (0.0132)    (0.0231) (0.0720) 
GDP growth (%)      -0.00307*   -0.00295* -0.00310* 
      (0.00124)   (0.00125) (0.00149) 
GDP/cap (millions)       1.369  -0.176 -1.692 
       (2.247)  (1.619) (1.935) 
Gini        0.000173  0.000636 
        (0.00116)  (0.000996) 
Constant 0.00209 0.0212 0.0735 0.0582 0.0710 0.0983* 0.0571 0.0738 0.0797* 0.0529 
 (0.0436) (0.0343) (0.0440) (0.0406) (0.0433) (0.0427) (0.0389) (0.0622) (0.0392) (0.0515) 
           
# of MFIs 1,553 1,531 1,247 1,180 1,247 1,247 1,247 913 1,180 883 
# of Countries 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 12 10 
R-squared 8.3% 7.1% 11.9% 14.6% 12.1% 12.5% 12.0% 16.8% 15.8% 21.2% 
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
**** p<0.0001, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table S2 above shows that UG rejection rates, at the country level, are robustly predictive of 
bank-level defaults rates. The fact that the UG rejection rate in each country is importantly 
predictive of default rates at the bank level suggests that it is the resident psychology of the 
borrowers, not administrative quirks of MFIs, that is driving defaults. This pattern of results hold 
if we omit UG offers, as was the case in the last set of regressions. 
 
There are a few main results to note in this regression table. First, UG rejection rates are robustly 
predictive after controlling for economic development indicators (specifications 9 and 10). 
Second, by and large, the developmental indicators are not strong predictors of default, which 
suggests that there is something other than economic conditions that is driving defaults. Third, 
loan yield—a proxy for interest rates—is not predictive of default rates over and above the 
controls in specification 4. (Interestingly, loan yields are not predictive of defaults rates within a 
given MFI, β = -0.005, SE = 0.007, p = 0.419.) Fourth, the next best predictor of defaults after 
Ultimatum Game rejection rates is the percentage of borrowers that are female. This is a nice 
replication of one of the early studies done trying to understand default rates and how group 
dynamics promote or avoid defaults.  
 
Cross-cultural surveys, game play, defaults, and economic controls 
 
Using a separate meta-analysis of cross-cultural differences in Trust Game behavior, in addition 
to Ultimatum Game behavior we were able to look at the relationship between trust, 
trustworthiness, and default rates. In Table S3 below, we show the relationships between 
behavior in the Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, WVS trust, WVS civic cooperation, democracy, 
corruption, and rule of law after controlling for the economic development status of the country. 
The analysis in Table S3 reflects country-level outcomes and is restricted to 2007 to 2014. 
  
 
Table S3. Game play and survey variables predicting default rates with economic controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Portfolios at risk 
                    
UG rejection rate 0.4610**         
 (0.0958)         
UG offers  0.1660        
  (0.3753)        
TG % sent   0.1189       
   (0.0629)       
TG % returned    0.1195      
    (0.0552)      
WVS trust     -0.0328     
     (0.0442)     
WVS civic cooperation      0.0059    
      (0.0083)    
Democracy rank       -0.0000   
       (0.0003)   
Corruption rank        0.0004  
        (0.0003)  
Rule of law         -0.0192 
         (0.0166) 
GDP growth (%) 0.0058 -0.0021 -0.0048 -0.0125 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0084* -0.0078 -0.0059 
 (0.0061) (0.0140) (0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0039) 
GDP (trillions) 0.0282 -0.0132 0.0049 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0065 -0.0124 -0.0148 -0.0120 
 (0.0495) (0.1200) (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0239) 
GDP per capita (millions) 4.6645 1.5217 -2.5720 -4.2209 4.8308 5.1265 0.1022 2.4505 2.5760 
 (3.2669) (8.4529) (2.1887) (2.0655) (2.6649) (2.8815) (2.9732) (3.0689) (2.9128) 
Gini 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013 
 (0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Constant -0.0760 0.0981 0.0448 0.0771 0.1063 0.0737 0.0660 0.0182 0.0340 
 (0.0946) (0.2499) (0.0748) (0.0624) (0.0548) (0.0489) (0.0548) (0.0566) (0.0431) 
          
Observations 11 11 15 15 45 42 71 71 76 
R-squared 83.4% 10.0% 49.0% 53.2% 14.6% 14.9% 9.5% 11.7% 8.6% 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05         
 
 
The only variable that is robustly predictive of defaults rates after controlling for economic 
development status are Ultimatum Game rejection rates, which is positively related to defaults. 
On the social capital account of repayment, trustworthiness should be negatively related to 
default rates. Note that GDP is in trillions for ease of interpreting coefficients, but using the raw 
GDP does not change the result.  
Experiment 
 
Recruiting and Ultimatum Game 
 
Participants for the experiment were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We recruited 
only participants from the US. Participants first learned about the Ultimatum Game from the 
instructions below: 
 
In this interaction you are matched with one other person. 
One of you will be person A, one of you will be person B. 
Person A starts with 200 units and person B starts with 0. For this interaction, and those 
that follow, units will be converted at the end of the study to real dollars. Specifically, for 
every 10 units you earn you will receive 1 cent.  
First person A makes a choice, then person B responds. 
1) Person A will make an offer on how to split the 200 units with person B.   
2) Person B will either accept or reject this offer.  
If person B accepts, then B will get the offered amount and A will keep the rest. 
If B rejects the offer then both individuals will get 0 units. 
 
Participants then answered a set of comprehension questions about the Ultimatum Game while 
they still had access to the instructions. The comprehension questions are below: 
 
1. What choice by Player A will result in Player A earning the most money? 
[Player A offering Player B nothing, Player A offering Player B everything, It depends on 
what the receiver is willing to accept] 
2. Which choice by Player B will result in Player B earning the most money? 
[Player B deciding to accept the offer, Player B deciding to reject the offer] 
3. If Player B decides to accept Player A's offer, what happens? 
[Each Player's bonus is determined by Player A's offer, Each Player gets a random bonus, 
Both Players get no bonus] 
4. If Player B decides to reject Player A's offer, what happens? 
[Each Player's bonus is determined by Player A's offer, Each Player gets a random bonus, 
Both Players get no bonus]  
 
Once participants had passed the comprehension test, we elicited their MAO. They could choose 
in 10-unit increments between 0 and 200. After they had reported their MAO, they reported what 
they would offer, using the same increments as the MAO. 
 
Baseline and Social Dilemma Interactions 
 
After the Ultimatum Game, participants moved onto the main portion of the experiment. They 
were randomly assigned to a group with 2 other people and each group was randomly assigned to 
either the Baseline condition or the Social Dilemma condition. 
 
Below are the instructions and comprehension questions for the Baseline condition: 
 
You have been assigned to a group with 2 other people. You each will have the 
opportunity to earn units over a series of rounds of play, which will be converted to real 
money at a rate of 10 units per cent.  
Each of you will be assigned an identifier, but these identifiers are randomly shuffled 
each round. Thus you will not be able to track the behavior of the other people from 
round to round. 
Each round works as follows: 
 
1) Each of you receives a randomly determined number of units, between 0 and 500. 
Each of you may receive a different amount. You do not know the amounts received by 
the other group members, and they do not know the amount you receive. 
2) You each choose how many of these units to keep toward your bonus, and how many 
to contribute to the group.  In order to continue to the next round, each person must 
contribute 200 units to the group. Otherwise, the game ends and none of you have a 
chance to earn additional money, unless a group member ‘pitches in’ in stage 3. 
3) If anyone in your group contributes less than 200 units, the group is told how many 
additional units are needed to meet the 200-unit-per-person threshold. Then each of you 
in turn can choose whether (or to what extent) to ‘pitch in’ and make up the difference by 
contributing more than 200 units yourself.   
4) If the threshold is met, your group will continue to the next round. Your group will 
play at least 8 rounds. After the 8th round, there is a 50% probability that there will be 
another round, and another, and so on. If the threshold is not met, the game ends 
immediately and none of you have a chance to earn any further bonus money. 
 
Participants then answered the following comprehension questions and if they failed one or more 
(in either condition) they were excluded from the remained of the study. 
 
1) Might you receive a different amount of starting money in each round than other people 
in your group? [Yes / No] 
2) How many units are you responsible for contributing each round? [100, 200, 300, 400, 
500, 600] 
3) If you or someone in your group does not make their full contribution, what happens? 
[the game ends immediately; nothing happens and the game continues to the next round; 
other group members can ‘pitch in’ and make up the difference in that player’s 
contribution] 
4) After the ‘pitching in’ phase is over, if you or someone in your group has failed to 
contribute enough units to get over the 200 unit threshold, what happens? [the game ends 
immediately; nothing happens and the game continues to the next round; everyone gets a 
bonus unit] 
 
Below are the instructions and comprehension questions for the Social Dilemma condition: 
 
You have been assigned to a group with 2 other people. You each will have the 
opportunity to earn units over a series of rounds of play, which will be converted to real 
money at a rate of 10 units per cent.  
Each of you will be assigned an identified, but these identifiers are randomly shuffled 
each round. Thus you will not be able to track the behavior of the other people from 
round to round. 
Each round works as follows: 
 
1) Each of you receives a randomly determined number of units, between 0 and 500. 
Each of you may receive a different amount. You do not know the amounts received by 
the other group members, and they do not know the amount you receive. 
2) You each choose how many of these units to keep toward your bonus, and how many 
to contribute to the group.  In order to continue to the next round, a total of at least 600 
units must be contributed to the group. Otherwise, the game ends and none of you have a 
chance to earn additional money. 
3) If less than 600 units are contributed, the group is told how many additional units are 
needed to meet the 600-unit threshold. Then each of you in turn can choose whether to 
‘pitch in’ and make up the difference by contributing more, unless a group member 
‘pitches in’ in stage 3.  
4) If the threshold is met, your group will continue to the next round. Your group will 
play at least 8 rounds. After the 8th round, there is a 50% probability that there will be 
another round, and another, and so on. If the threshold is not met, the game ends 
immediately and none of you have a chance to earn any further bonus money. 
 
After reading the instructions, participants in the threshold condition answered the following 
comprehension questions. 
1) Might you receive a different amount of starting money in each round than other 
people in your group? [Yes / No] 
2) How many units is your group responsible for contributing each round? [100, 200, 
300, 400, 500, 600] 
3) If your group does not make its full contribution, what happens? [the game ends 
immediately; nothing happens and the game continues to the next round; the 
group members can ‘pitch in’ and make up the difference] 
4) After the ‘pitching in’ is done, if your group failed to contribute enough units to 
get over the 600 unit threshold, what happens? [the game ends immediately; 
nothing happens and the game continues to the next round; everyone gets a bonus 
unit] 
 
  
Regression table 
 
Below is a regression table that shows the regression results from the three sets of statistical 
models we fit. Specifications 1-4 are fit using logistic regression, while specifications 5 and 6 are 
fit using OLS regression. For each specification, we use the lowest MAO in the group in order to 
capture the how inequity averse the group’s least inequity averse member was. Groups with 
lower minimum MAOs have at least one member who will be more willing to pitch in, while 
groups with high minimum MAOs are less likely to have a member who will be willing to pitch 
in. 
 
Table S4. Regression results from the experimental data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Defaulted at any point Defaulted in first round Fraction of rounds foregone 
              
Group minimum MAO 4.719*** 4.655** 3.952*** 3.713* 0.636** 0.747** 
 (1.766) (2.057) (1.451) (2.219) (0.286) (0.361) 
Condition (Social dilemma=1) 1.590*** 1.554** 1.305*** 1.194 0.276*** 0.327** 
 (0.484) (0.763) (0.437) (0.898) (0.074) (0.132) 
Group minimum MAO x Condition  0.245  -0.412  0.264 
  (4.017)  (2.929)  (0.558) 
Constant 0.553 0.539 2.261*** 2.186*** 0.665*** 0.690*** 
 (0.462) (0.512) (0.551) (0.759) (0.081) (0.0972) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 11.8% 11.9% 9.2% 9.2% 12.2% 12.4% 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
  
